First Crossfire Hurricane declas drop!
Here's my initial recap, with Grok's help
Last night, a tranche of newly declassified Crossfire Hurricane docs was released. I loaded them into Grok to help me quickly understand and summarize them, as they total several hundred pages.
My first impression is that this initial batch of documents is highly curated, is light on revelations, and omits anything substantial in any way about General Flynn, whose FBI codename during the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was Crossfire Razor.
The biggest focus of the documents is Christopher Steele. A two-day long interview from 2017 is the focus of the first 100 pages of the documents. There are also interview notes from Carter Page, Joseph Mifsud, and notes from a 13 minute counterintelligence briefing that the FBI’s Joseph Pientka gave to Trump, Chris Christie and Flynn in August, 2016.
The drop was divided into seven PDF documents. I’ll provide Grok’s summaries of each of those documents, with my take of each one following.
Document 1: Steele Interview (FD-302, Pages 3-9, etc.)
This is an FBI Form FD-302 summarizing a two-day interview with Christopher Steele of Orbis Business Intelligence, conducted September 18-19, 2017, in London by SSA Brian J. Auten. Steele’s colleague Christopher Burrows was present briefly at the start.
Relationship with FBI: Steele and Burrows expressed frustration over the end of their FBI relationship, citing a contractual arrangement where Steele was the “face” of Orbis. They apologized for going to the press in fall 2016, explaining they were “riding two horses”—their client (likely Fusion GPS) and the FBI. After Comey reopened the Clinton email probe, they prioritized their client, leading to media leaks. Burrows was more concerned about unpaid money than Steele.
Primary Subsource: Steele wouldn’t name his primary subsource but said this person, introduced by Fiona Hill around 2011 (when Hill was at Brookings), had met Sergey Millian and shared a photo of Millian with Trump. Steele tried to record a meeting but failed. The subsource had ties to high-level Russians like Peskov and Ivanov, and Steele vouched for their reliability based on past consistency.
Trump as Opponent: Steele and Burrows saw Trump as their “main opponent,” fearing his presidency would harm the UK-US alliance.
Fusion GPS and Ohr: Steele confirmed Glenn Simpson knew he was sharing info with the FBI, and they pushed Bruce Ohr to act on it.
Later Pages: The OCR gets messy (e.g., Page 7 repeats “traveling” excessively), but Steele discusses early 2016 election intel being an “open secret” in Moscow, with his subsource easily gathering info until sources tightened up later.
Takeaway
Steele’s a mix of calculated operator and frustrated insider. He’s cagey about his subsource but admits to balancing commercial and FBI interests, ultimately choosing the former when pressed. The Trump animus is clear, and the subsource’s ties to Millian hint at the dossier’s origins—though it’s all hearsay at this point.
My take:
Steele’s overt hatred of Trump and his clear knowledge that he was working for the DNC and Hillary Clinton and at the same time closely with the FBI give us a clear picture of the corruption within the FBI, that they were clearly choosing sides. The FBI investigated and targeted Trump and their alleged sources in his campaign for trying to acquire Clinton’s hacked emails from the Russians, but had no problem using clearly fictitious reports that were generated with funding from the DNC as evidence against Trump. The duplicity is truly terrible.
HOWEVER, contrary to the what Kash Patel and the Nunes Memo alleged, the Steele Dossier was not the main predicate for the FISA warrant against Carter Page, which was used to spy directly on Trump and his entire immediate orbit. I believe the inclusion of this document as the first of the declassified documents signals an attempt to direct our attention at Steele instead of Flynn, Page and Papadopoulos.
Document 2: More Steele documents
Key Points
Steele’s FBI Oversight (FD-1040a Reports):
Timeline: Three quarterly reports (January-April 2016, April-July 2016, July-October 2016) and an annual report (October 2015-October 2016) track Steele’s work with the FBI, managed by Agent Michael Gaeta in Rome.
Performance: Steele was reliable, with no criminal activity or testimony expected. His intel was valued for identifying Russian espionage techniques and activities (e.g., 13 stats in 2016, like FIS techniques and disseminations).
Closure: By November 2016, Steele was closed as a source after admitting to leaking info to Mother Jones (October 31, 2016 article), breaching FBI exclusivity rules.
Rome Meeting (October 3, 2016):
Setup: Steele met the Crossfire Hurricane team in Rome, alone (his partner couldn’t attend), to discuss Russian election interference. He was paid $15,000 for the meeting.
Operations: Steele ran a London intel firm, using a primary "agent handler" in Russia to collect from unwitting sub-sources. He feared for this handler’s safety as Russian sources grew silent on Trump ties.
FBI Tasking: The team briefed Steele on Crossfire Hurricane, focusing on Manafort (FURY), Flynn (RAZOR), and Page (DRAGON). They wanted specific intel, evidence, or witnesses on Trump-Russia links, offering big payments (up to $1M) for actionable info.
Steele’s Ties: He admitted sharing Trump info with a State Department friend (later identified as Jonathan Winer) and claimed friendship with Ivanka Trump, doubting her involvement.
Gaeta’s Email (September 19, 2016):
Sub-Source Intel: Gaeta shared Steele’s notes, naming Sergey Millian as a sub-source (Source E, 2016-95) who met Steele’s handler and boasted about Trump ties. Other names (e.g., Greg Hartley, Aras Agalarov) were flagged for Russian influence ops.
Context: Sent to Crossfire Hurricane agents (Pientka, Strzok, Auten), this predates the Rome meeting, showing Steele’s early dossier inputs.
Takeaway
This document reveals Steele’s dual role as an FBI informant and private intel broker, culminating in a tense Rome meeting where the FBI pushed for Trump-Russia dirt. The big revelations are Steele’s closure for leaking (ending his FBI trust), his reliance on a Russian handler amid growing risks, and the FBI’s focus on Carter Page (DRAGON) as a potential weak link. It paints a picture of a high-stakes, messy operation where Steele’s dossier work clashed with FBI control, unraveling just before the 2016 election heated up. The Ivanka connection adds a personal twist, though unverified here.
My Take
That The FBI paid Steele $15K to meet with them and offered him up to $1M for more information showed how this really was an investigation in search of a crime.
I looked further into what the FBI briefed Steele on in October 2016 regarding Manafort, Flynn and Page and the focus was primarily on Page, as they had already secured the FISA warrant at that point. The mention of Flynn appears to be limited to a mention that he was a subject of the investigation.
Steele mentioning that he was friends with Ivanka Trump is a noteworthy, if unsubstantiated and not particularly meaningful.
Brief Summary of Document 3 (FBI-HJC119-CH-000201 to 000300)
Document Overview: This 100-page section (Tab 3) from the "Crossfire Hurricane Redacted Binder" details FBI interactions with a Confidential Human Source (CHS) codenamed "MITCH" (Stefan Halper), managed by Agent Stephen Somma in New York. It includes payment records (FD-794b) and memos about meetings and operational plans targeting Crossfire Hurricane subjects, primarily "DRAGON" (Carter Page), but also "TYPHOON" (George Papadopoulos), "FURY" (Paul Manafort), and "RAZOR" (Michael Flynn), from August 2016 to January 2017.
Key Points:
Payments to Halper: Four payments totaling $70,000 were made between August 2016 and February 2017 for services related to a "sensitive investigation" (e.g., $5,000 on 8/19/2016, $25,000 on 2/1/2017).
Meetings with Carter Page (DRAGON):
August 11-12, 2016: Halper met Page in the U.K. (July 2016) and Virginia, discussing Page’s Gazprom ties and Trump campaign role. The FBI planned to record a private meeting on 8/20/2016 to probe Russian ties.
October 17, 2016: After Page left the campaign, Halper lured him for lunch, asking about Russia links. Page hinted at Russian funding for a think tank but was evasive.
January 5, 2017: Page discussed Moscow talks with the New Economic School (NES), suggesting high-level Russian government support for his think tank idea.
Other Targets: Halper was tasked to engage Papadopoulos (TYPHOON) via a U.K. university event and recalled a 2014 encounter with Flynn (RAZOR) involving a suspicious woman, Svetlana Lokhova. He also knew Manafort (FURY) for 30 years but doubted meeting feasibility.
Operational Plans: The FBI used Halper’s academic cover to elicit info, installing recording devices in his Virginia home (one-party consent state) to monitor Page, aiming to confirm Russian coordination with the Trump campaign.
Takeaway: This document exposes the FBI’s strategic use of Stefan Halper to covertly probe Trump campaign figures, especially Carter Page, with cash incentives and recorded setups. The big reveal is Page’s flirtation with Russian funding post-campaign, though he dodged direct admissions—showing Halper’s role as a persistent, if not fully successful, insider tool in Crossfire Hurricane’s early phase. It’s a gritty look at how the FBI fished for dirt, blending academia and espionage.
My Take
Halper, whose longtime involvement in Republican politics includes involvement in the Iran Contra controversy, was also paid by the FBI. This is not a new revelation at all, as it had been public knowledge since around 2018. I see Halper as more of a chaos agent who may have gathered intel for the FBI but did not produce anything particularly meaningful.
Brief Summary of Document 4 (FBI-HJC119-CH-000301 to 000400)
Document Overview: This 100-page section (Tab 4) from the "Crossfire Hurricane Redacted Binder" contains 534 text messages between FBI personnel Lisa Page and Peter Strzok, spanning March 3, 2016, to May 10, 2017. These exchanges cover their work on Crossfire Hurricane (CH), personal sentiments, and reactions to media and political developments.
Crossfire Hurricane Work: The texts cover CH logistics (e.g., pre-meeting for mid-year review, 3/24/2016, line 33), frustrations with leaks (e.g., 4/2/2017, line 398), and operational plans (e.g., Baker’s provocative idea, 4/11/2017, line 403). "RAZOR" (Flynn) appears twice:
Line 377 (3/23/2017, 9:24 PM): "Also, [redacted] said [redacted] called, wanting to talk with Bill with ig (I think) about razor...."—suggesting a discussion involving Flynn with someone senior (possibly Bill Priestap) and an inspector general context.
Line 486 (6/1/2017, 8:16 PM): "I.e., wind vs. Razor"—part of a cryptic exchange about a meeting topic, implying Flynn ("Razor") is pitted against "wind" (possibly Walid Phares, codenamed "CROSS WIND," though unclear here).
Media and Leaks: They react to articles (e.g., NYT on Clinton emails, 3/3/2016, line 29; mid-year piece, 4/22/2017, line 418), vent about inaccuracies (3/2/2017, line 319), and ponder leak sources (e.g., HPSCI, 3/17/2017, line 351).
Personal and Political: Anti-Trump bias emerges (e.g., 8/8/2016, line 100: "he’s not ever going to become president"), mixed with personal stress (e.g., 3/7/2017, line 326: "I’m about to explode re dave").
Takeaway: The Strzok-Page texts offer a candid window into Crossfire Hurricane’s grind, with two "RAZOR" mentions (lines 377 and 486) spotlighting Flynn’s recurring relevance—first in a high-level call (March 2017) and later as a meeting focus (June 2017, post-firing). Beyond Flynn, the exchanges blend CH coordination, leak paranoia, and raw emotion, painting a messy, human picture of the FBI’s Trump-Russia probe amid 2016-2017 turmoil.
My Take:
While I haven’t read all of these texts myself, I’m not seeing any new revelations in these messages. We already know the two “lovebirds,” as Trump has frequently called them, hated Trump and were motivated on trying to take him out politically and criminally if they could.
The wind vs. Razor comment sounded cryptic and intriguing. I read the contextual messages and I believe what they meant by that was they believed that the US Attorney’s Office was wanting to get involved with Flynn, signaling the upcoming indictments for his lies to the FBI.
Summary of Document 5 (FBI-HJC119-CH-000491 to 000500)
Document Overview: This section from the "Crossfire Hurricane Redacted Binder" includes a partial Steele dossier report index (pages 491-500) and additional Strzok-Page text messages (lines 436-534, starting at FBI-HJC119-CH-000401). It details dossier content from 2016 and corroboration notes, alongside FBI internal reactions from April to June 2017.
Key Points:
Dossier Reports (Pages 491-500):
2016/086 (7/26/15): Describes FSB-led cyber ops targeting Western entities, with limited success against top-tier targets but more against secondary ones (e.g., Latvia). Notes coercion of U.S. citizens of Russian descent and malware in games.
2016/94 (7/19/16): Alleges a secret Sechin-Page meeting on energy and Ukraine sanctions, corroborated by a sub-source (identity redacted).
2016/95 (Jul/Aug 16): Claims Trump-Manafort coordination with Russia, DNC leaks to WikiLeaks, and a Ukraine policy shift, with mixed corroboration (e.g., Page denied meeting Manafort, but RNC platform changes align).
Strzok-Page Texts (Lines 436-534):
Media Reactions: Discuss NYT articles (e.g., 4/22/17, line 436), Comey’s testimony buzz (6/7/17, line 501), and media naming Strzok (6/8/17, line 509).
Case Updates: Mention delaying a case opening (4/26/17, line 441), an ML arrest (6/3/17, line 495), and Mueller’s team dynamics (6/3/17, line 496).
Personal Sentiments: Express exhaustion and frustration post-Comey firing (5/16/17, line 464; 6/2/17, line 494).
Takeaway: This document juxtaposes dossier allegations (e.g., Page-Sechin ties, Russian cyber ops) with Strzok-Page’s real-time stress and media scrutiny in 2017. It’s a fragmented look at Crossfire Hurricane’s raw intel and the FBI’s internal chaos as the investigation morphed under Mueller, with partial corroboration hinting at both substance and gaps.
My Take
This section doesn’t seem to have any major revelations.
Summary of Document 6 (FBI-HJC119-CH-000501 to 000576)
Document Overview: This section from the "Crossfire Hurricane Redacted Binder" continues the Steele Dossier report index, covering reports from July to September 2016 (pages 501-576). It details allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election, Trump campaign ties, and corroboration from open-source and FBI data.
Key Points:
Dossier Reports:
2016/95 (Jul/Aug 16): Claims a Russian cyber network targeted Clinton, with Trump agreeing to sideline Ukraine issues for Russia’s benefit. Corroborated by RNC platform changes (e.g., J.D. Gordon’s role) and Trump’s NATO stance (7/21/16).
2016/97 (7/30/16): Notes Kremlin concern over DNC hack fallout, Trump team nervousness, and an 8-year intelligence exchange. Partial corroboration via media (e.g., Rybakov’s 11/10/16 statement) and Trump’s Russia trips (1987, 2008).
2016/100 (8/5/16): Alleges Kremlin divisions post-DNC leaks, with Ivanov opposing Peskov’s interference. Ivanov’s sacking (8/12/16) aligns, though motives vary in sources.
2016/101 (8/10/16): Describes Kremlin targeting U.S. youth, celebrating elite splits, and funding visits (e.g., Flynn, Page, Stein to Moscow). Flynn’s RT payment ($33,750, 12/15) and Page’s Dvorkovich meeting (9/16) corroborate.
2016/102 (8/10/16): Suggests DNC leaks aimed at Sanders voters, with Trump’s team adjusting tactics. Media (e.g., LA Times, 7/25/16) supports Clinton’s “Russia Card” use.
2016/105 (8/22/16): Ties Manafort to Ukraine payments ($12M ledger, NYT 8/14/16), raising Kremlin fears of exposure.
2016/111 (9/14/16): Reports Kremlin silence on interference, Ivanov’s sacking, and more Clinton kompromat (Podesta emails, 10/7/16). Putin’s Valdai speech (10/27/16) aligns with policy shift goals.
Corroboration Notes:
Mix of open-source (e.g., NYT, CNN, Washington Post) and FBI interviews (e.g., Page, Flynn, Manafort).
Some claims (e.g., Flynn’s payments, Page’s meetings) find traction; others (e.g., direct Kremlin-Trump coordination) lack firm evidence or remain redacted.
Flynn Mentions:
First Mention (Page 591):
Text: "I further stated that I was aware of only two White House employees who were in contact with the Russian government: Michael Flynn and Hope Hicks. I reminded him that we discussed the substance of Mr. Flynn's contacts on Friday, 02/10/2017."
Context: This occurs during a sensitive post-briefing talk with Priebus, after a counterintelligence briefing at the White House. McCabe corrects a New York Times article (2/14/17) claiming widespread FBI probes into Trump campaign-Russia ties, narrowing it to Flynn and Hicks. The prior discussion (2/10/17) likely refers to Flynn’s calls with Russian Ambassador Kislyak, which led to his resignation on February 13, 2017, over misrepresenting those talks to Pence.
Significance: McCabe’s focus on Flynn underscores his prominence in early Crossfire Hurricane scrutiny, aligning with Flynn’s codename "RAZOR" in earlier Strzok-Page texts (e.g., Document 4, lines 377, 486). The 2/10/17 reference suggests an ongoing FBI-White House dialogue about Flynn’s actions, pre-resignation, possibly tied to the January 24, 2017, FBI interview where Flynn lied about the calls (later prosecuted by Mueller).
Second Mention (Page 597):
Text: "These comments included the President’s requests for assurances of loyalty, statements about the Russia investigation and the investigation of General Michael Flynn."
Context: In a May 16, 2017, meeting with DAG Rosenstein, McCabe justifies opening an investigation into Trump, citing possible obstruction linked to Comey’s firing. Flynn’s investigation is one of several Trump-Comey interactions (documented in Comey’s memos) raising obstruction concerns, alongside loyalty demands and Russia probe pressure.
Significance: Flynn’s inclusion here ties his case to broader allegations of Trump’s interference, post-resignation. It reflects the FBI’s view that Flynn’s predicament (e.g., his December 2016 Kislyak calls and subsequent lies) remained a flashpoint, potentially motivating Trump to fire Comey to derail related inquiries.
Takeaway: This document captures the dossier’s escalating narrative of Russian meddling—cyber ops, kompromat, and Trump ties—amid uneven corroboration. Flynn’s Moscow trip and Manafort’s Ukraine ledger stand out as concrete, while broader collusion claims lean on circumstantial media and redacted intel, reflecting Crossfire Hurricane’s messy, evolving scope in mid-2016.
My Take
Flynn was mentioned twice towards the end of this document, underscoring his significant ties to Russian intelligence, which I’d already been talking about for over a year. Still no revelations in this document.
Summary of Document 7 (FBI-HJC119-CH-000601 to 000684)
Document Overview: This section of the "Crossfire Hurricane Redacted Binder" (pages 601-684) spans Tabs 9-16 and includes memos, FD-302s, and emails from 2016-2018. It details FBI interactions with key figures in the Trump-Russia investigation, focusing on briefings, dossier handling, and investigative threads involving Michael Flynn, among others, amid a shifting political and legal landscape.
Key Points:
Tab 9 (Pages 601-605): Andrew McCabe’s memos (May 2017) recount meetings with DAG Rod Rosenstein and Special Counsel (SC) Robert Mueller post-Comey firing. Rosenstein suggests McCabe recuse himself from the Russia probe over a perceived conflict tied to his wife’s 2015 Virginia State Senate campaign, despite an FBI memo by AD Patrick Kelley finding no legal basis for recusal. Mueller declines to rule on it but flags McCabe as a potential witness. Lisa Page’s memo details Rosenstein’s frenetic recounting of Comey’s firing, Mueller’s appointment as SC, and concerns over McCabe’s credibility, including a debunked Circa News claim about McCabe celebrating Flynn’s exit.
Tab 10 (Pages 606-609): Bruce Ohr’s FD-302 (November 2016) outlines his decade-long relationship with "SHELLE" (likely Steele), starting in 2007. In July 2016, Steele shared dossier allegations over breakfast—Carter Page meeting Russian officials, Deripaska’s feud with Manafort, and Trump vulnerabilities—some already given to SA Gaeta. Ohr notes Steele’s info flowed to the Clinton campaign, Jon Winer at State, and the FBI, with his wife aiding Simpson’s open-source research.
Tab 11 (Pages 634-637) - Expanded Summary and Interpretation:
Summary: Joe Pientka’s memo (August 30, 2016) documents a counterintelligence and security briefing on August 17, 2016, at the FBI’s New York Field Office for Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, NJ Governor Chris Christie, and retired General Michael Flynn. Held in a TS/SCI SCIF, the 13-minute briefing by SSA Pientka covered foreign intelligence threats, emphasizing methodologies (HUMINT, SIGINT, Cyber) and the presence of Russian and Chinese Intelligence Officers (IOs) in the U.S. Trump asked if Russians were “bad” due to higher numbers, prompting Pientka to clarify threat severity isn’t number-driven. Flynn interjected with questions: correcting Pientka’s estimate of FBI agents (10,000 vs. Flynn’s 17,000), asking about High-Value Extremist (HVE) cases (circa 1,000), and comparing current IO threats to the Cold War (equal or greater). Flynn remarked to Trump that FBI resources were stretched thin. Pientka highlighted vulnerabilities in the candidates’ periphery (staff, associates) and electronic communications risks.
Interpretation: This briefing, pre-election, aimed to sensitize the Trump team to espionage risks as they neared access to classified data. Flynn’s active engagement—correcting agent numbers and probing resource allocation—reflects his DIA background and suggests skepticism about FBI capacity, possibly foreshadowing his later defensiveness over Russia ties. His Cold War comparison hints at a strategic lens on Russian threats, contrasting with dossier allegations of personal compromise (e.g., Tab 6’s 2016/101). Trump’s simplistic “are they bad” query indicates limited grasp of intelligence nuances, while Pientka’s responses balance caution with neutrality, avoiding operational specifics per ODNI ground rules. The exchange underscores early FBI-Trump team friction, with Flynn’s resource critique potentially signaling distrust later exploited in White House-FBI tensions.
Tab 12 (Pages 647-661): Emails (September-October 2016) reveal State Department awareness of the FBI’s relationship with "CROWN" (Steele), including a planned October 3 Rome meeting with SA Mike Gaeta. Kathy Kavalec and Victoria Nuland sought updates, while Jon Winer, identified later, received Steele’s reporting directly, bypassing FBI channels initially.
Tab 13 (Pages 664-667): James Wolfe’s FD-302s (October-December 2017) detail his role as SSCI Security Director handling a FISA document in March 2017. No Flynn mentions, but it ties to broader Russia probe leaks, with Wolfe coordinating SCIF access and later scheduling an FBI meeting.
Tab 15 (Pages 673-681) - Expanded Summary and Interpretation:
Summary: Admiral Michael Rogers’ FD-302 (June 12, 2017) recounts his role as NSA Director in ICA briefings and Trump interactions. In January 2017, Rogers, Comey, Clapper, and Brennan briefed President-Elect Trump on the ICA, with Comey tasked to address the Steele dossier, which Rogers relegated to an appendix due to its uncorroborated nature. Rogers lacked specifics on the FBI’s Russia probe but knew NSA shared Flynn data (e.g., Kislyak call), which he avoided reviewing, noting it was purged absent FISA coverage. Trump called Rogers on March 26, 2017, venting about the Russia probe’s impact on U.S.-Russia relations, questioning Russian hacking evidence, and asking if Rogers would publicly deny SIGINT proof—Rogers refused, citing classification. A memo by Deputy Ledgett, co-signed by Rogers, documented this. On April 13, 2017, Trump reiterated frustration post-NSA briefing, saying the “Russia thing has got to go away,” but issued no directives. Rogers saw Trump as unfamiliar with government processes, not pressuring him directly. In June 2017 SSCI testimony, Rogers declined to detail the call, affirming no illegal directives were given.
Interpretation: Rogers’ account positions him as a cautious bystander, balancing NSA’s role in ICA and Flynn data-sharing with deliberate distance from FBI specifics, reflecting interagency silos. Flynn’s mention ties to his Kislyak call—a key Crossfire Hurricane trigger—yet Rogers’ ignorance of details suggests NSA’s limited investigative role, focusing on technical collection (Tab 6’s 2016/101 alleges Flynn’s Moscow trip, unaddressed here). Trump’s calls reveal intent to shape public narrative without crossing into overt obstruction, with Rogers’ refusal to “go public” highlighting ethical boundaries. The March call memo’s distribution (SecDef, SSCI) indicates proactive transparency amid scrutiny, while Trump’s “venting” in April aligns with McCabe’s memos (Tab 9) of White House pressure post-Comey firing. Rogers’ businessman critique of Trump underscores a perceived naiveté, contrasting with Flynn’s seasoned queries in Tab 11, hinting at divergent team dynamics.
Tab 16 (Page 684): Joseph Mifsud’s FD-302 (February 2017) denies offering Papadopoulos DNC emails, framing their UK meeting as cyber-focused. He introduced Papadopoulos to Ivan Timofeev via email but claims no further contact post-Trump campaign exit.
Flynn Mentions:
Tab 11 (Page 635): Flynn corrects Pientka on FBI agent count (17,000) and asks about HVE cases (circa 1,000), suggesting resource inadequacy to Trump.
Tab 15 (Page 675): Rogers notes NSA shared Flynn-Kislyak call data with FBI, purged it without FISA, and avoided details, confirming one collection instance.
Tab 9 (Page 605): Page cites a false Circa News story of McCabe cheering Flynn’s firing, raised by Rosenstein as a credibility jab.
Takeaway: Document 7 reveals the FBI navigating a web of briefings (Tab 11), dossier vetting (Tab 10), and post-Comey fallout (Tab 9), with Flynn as a recurring but secondary figure—active in briefings (Tab 11), a data point in NSA-FBI exchanges (Tab 15), and a rumor in credibility debates (Tab 9). Tabs 11 and 15 highlight early Trump team exposure to intelligence threats and Trump’s later pushback, respectively, framing Flynn’s role as both operational and symbolic in the unfolding Russia probe saga.
My Take
Of the seven batches of documents, this is the most interesting, and I’ll probably dive deeper into it over the next week. The sections I’m most interested in are tabs 15 and 16.
Tab 11 describes a meeting where the FBI’s Pientka provides a counterintelligence brief to then candidate Trump, Chris Christie, and Flynn. Flynn’s questions indicate a desire to position himself as an intelligence expert, which I guess I’d probably try to do in his position also.
Tab 15 provides some more insight on Admiral Rogers, who I’m interested in. It’s noteworthy that Trump called and asked for Rogers’ help but he refused.
Tab 16 is perhaps the most revelatory aspect of this entire tranche of documents, as it shows Mifsud denying the official narrative story that he had attempted to honeypot Papadopoulos and offered him Hillary’s emails. More on that later.
Bottomline
This is obviously just one drop, hopefully of many to come. There is still much of the story to come, and these documents provide no exciting new revelations.
I am concerned that the purpose of this drop is to shape the narrative before more details emerge. I’ll continue to watch future drops closely, and will examine part 7 of this tranche in more detail in the near future.